Lawson for Congress

Last night’s gathering at South Granville High School in Creedmoor was a poignant illustration of the crisis of confidence between our federal government and its citizens. I had the opportunity to speak with people on both sides of the issue — local citizens opposed to NBAF, as well as representatives from Homeland Security, the USDA, government contractors, and our local consortium desiring to bring the laboratory to the area.

At the end of the evening, what stood out was the profound lack of trust in our federal government. Person after person approached the microphone to ask the panel to essentially predict the future. Almost every question asked for long-term assurance regarding safety, transparency, governance, and accountability. Many questions couldn’t be answered until the Environmental Impact Statement is prepared. When answers were offered, however, they were received with palpable skepticism among the lab’s opponents.

Unfortunately, no members of last night’s panel can predict the future. Despite their best intentions, the lab’s representatives from Homeland Security, USDA, and various government contractors are incapable of delivering on any verbal promises made last night. At the end of the evening, we’re still left with the nagging question of whether our region wants the largest BSL-4 laboratory to study the most dangerous organisms in our backyard, when that laboratory’s use will be dictated by ongoing threat assessments by our Department of Homeland Security and the USDA.

My question to the panel was a slightly different one — why do we need this boondoggle at all? We’re looking to spend $450 million on this laboratory, which is money that we don’t have, to study diseases that are not yet endemic to our country. Does it really make sense to spend money we don’t have to concentrate the risk of studying and housing all these exotic diseases in a single large facility?

Make no mistake, each of these diseases is a cause for alarm. We absolutely should contribute to the global body of knowledge to diagnose, treat, and ultimately prevent these diseases from causing a public health disaster. But let’s consider an alternative: since each of these diseases is endemic somewhere, there is already research being done right now in laboratories around the world.

Why can’t we embrace a collaborative approach, and encourage our scientists to work at the best existing laboratories for these diseases around the world? Such studies are being done where the diseases are already endemic. If we believe we have the best safety and containment protocols, why not share those with other countries where they are already studying the diseases, and reduce the risks inherent in existing laboratories? Why not encourage laboratories that have already specialized in a few of these diseases, and thus reduce the “risk concentration” of a single large repository for dangerous pathogens?

I asked this question, and was told that we need this laboratory since we will not be able to rely on international cooperation in the event of a widespread outbreak. For example, in a global Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak, the UK would meet its own needs before it would share assays or treatments with us.

That answer still falls short for me. In a collaborative environment, as our scientists help create diagnostic assays, treatments, or vaccines for each disease, we can begin commercializing the resulting technology domestically so that we are assured of our own defense.

Is this really the best way to spend $450 million, plus ongoing operating expenses?

This entry was posted on Friday, February 22nd, 2008 at 11:45 am and is filed under NBAF, environmentalism, local politics, property rights, science. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.