Lawson for Congress

For those who study our financial system, the past few weeks have been interesting, and concerning. I don’t know if it’s possible to overstate my concern for our future — both as citizens as the United States of America, and as inhabitants of a world that is increasingly interconnected yet dependent on a fundamentally flawed financial and monetary system.

If asked to pick one word to describe why I’m running for Congress, that word is sustainability. Sustainability doesn’t mean stability, it doesn’t mean safety, and it doesn’t mean protection from life’s inevitable uncertainties. Sustainability does mean recognizing and obeying the natural laws that govern of our world.

Every branch of science has certain laws: Objects in motion tend to stay in motion; force equals mass times acceleration; every action has an equal and opposite reaction; energy in a closed system cannot be created or destroyed but merely changed in form; and closed systems tend towards increased entropy are a few good examples.

These laws of motion and conservation of energy are not limited to high school physics class. Every system in nature must obey these underlying principles — including our financial and monetary systems.

Let’s start with Newton’s laws of motion — it’s a short hop from there to defining leverage as the ability to move a large object a short distance using a small force exerted over a long distance. Leverage is a concept in finance, as well — using borrowed money to increase returns based upon small underlying price movements. Just as the car lifted with a hydraulic jack can hurt you if it falls, a small price movement in an imprudently leveraged investment can wipe out a lifetime of savings.

Next consider conservation of energy and open versus closed systems. Since energy within a closed system cannot be created or destroyed, and since closed systems tend towards increasing entropy, every growing system must be open to an external energy source. In this setting, one can immediately see problems with our debt-based monetary system.

What is debt-based monetary system? It’s where money is debt, and every dollar in circulation exists because a bank created it out of nothing based upon someone’s promise to pay it back, with interest.

Our economy is an open system relative to money, which is created and destroyed by banks. Banks create the money through loans — but they only create the amount you borrow. They don’t create the interest that you also promise to repay. Where do you get the interest? You have to earn it, but first it has to be created — yes, by someone else borrowing more money that they promise to repay with still more interest.

In the end, our monetary system is like a game of musical chairs — the banks create money based upon someone’s willingness to borrow, and the bank’s ability to lend. The constant demand for new money to repay interest on existing money compels growth and new money creation at an accelerating rate.

Refer to the chart of America’s total debt, which raises obvious questions about sustainability. Trees do not grow to the sky — and when banks cannot lend, or people are no longer willing to borrow, the music stops. When the music stops, there are more loans outstanding than money to repay, so everyone left standing loses whatever they pledged in exchange for their loans. Even worse, money that was created out of nothing through borrowing just as easily disappears back into nothing as asset values plummet — so when the music stops, the chairs start disappearing from the room.

Leverage, debt-based money, fractional reserve banking, and interest are fundamental features of our economic system. Our economic history of boom/bust cycles and decisions dominated by short-term gain as opposed to long-term stewardship are fundamental consequences of this underlying system. In short, our system has undesirable consequences and is fundamentally unstable — but it’s working as designed.

What we are experiencing today is a perfect storm of rising demand for natural resources in the setting of  global growth, a declining domestic currency due to decades of unsustainable debt (= money) creation and spending, coupled with an unfolding credit crisis that has crippled the debt (= money) creation system. What happens next?

I don’t know. Economists and analysts are searching for an analogy to our current position. Are we in the 1970s? Are we Japan in the 1990s? Are we entering the 1930s? Each situation is unique, and this one is no exception. There is evidence that we have experienced “peak credit“, and are popping a credit bubble that has been forming for over 20 years. That is reminiscent of Japan in the 1990s, or the 1930s. We’re also suffering from high energy prices, like the 1970s, although in this case we’re facing global tight supplies in the setting of rising demand.

Today’s news capped off several weeks of concerning developments. Illustrating the danger of leverage, our largest mortgage companies, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, are fighting rumors of insolvency:

The companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been hit hard by the mortgage foreclosure crisis. Their shares are plummeting and their borrowing costs are rising as investors worry that the companies will suffer losses far larger than the $11 billion they have already lost in recent months. Now, as housing prices decline further and foreclosures grow, the markets are worried that Fannie and Freddie themselves may default on their debt.

Under a conservatorship, the shares of Fannie and Freddie would be worth little or nothing, and any losses on mortgages they own or guarantee — which could be staggering — would be paid by taxpayers.

The government officials said that the administration had also considered calling for legislation that would offer an explicit government guarantee on the $5 trillion of debt owned or guaranteed by the companies. But that is a far less attractive option, they said, because it would effectively double the size of the public debt.

These companies funded 80% of the mortgages issued in the first half of 2008, and are thus almost fully responsible for supporting the housing market at its current levels. Ready to talk about leverage? In May, Fannie and Freddie had $83 billion in capital supporting over $5 trillion in debt and other obligations. That’s leverage — every dollar in debt is supported by less than two cents.

Here are some excellent commentaries on the dangers of these quasi-federal companies (read: we’re all going to take the hit) that inflate housing prices and define moral hazard:

Former St. Louis Fed President Poole Calls Freddie, Fannie “Insolvent”

Disaster Planning for Freddie and Fannie

Freddie and Fannie: Conservatorship as Endgame?

Fannie and Freddie Waterfalls Are Too Big to Bail

Fannie and Freddie are just the most recent problem to flare up, however. A contraction in the mortgage market was only the beginning — losses are spilling over throughout the economy. As Nouriel Roubini notes, total loss estimates from the credit crisis across all sectors of the economy are up to $1.6 trillion:

As I argued in writings last February such credit losses would be at least $1 trillion and could be as high as $2 trillion, well above the $300 billion of subprime writedowns that have been recognized so far. At that time the $1 trillion estimate was considered as lunatic but by now the IMF estimates these losses at $945 billion, George Magnus of UBS estimated them at $1 trillion; Goldman Sachs put them at $1.1 trillion, the legendary hedge fund manager John Paulson (who made last year $3.5 billion of income on shorting subprime) put them at $1.3 trillion; and a couple of days ago Bridgewater Associates estimated such losses at $1.6 trillion. Thus, as I argued then $1 trillion would be floor, not a ceiling, to such credit losses.

Of course such losses have been in part transferred from US banks to capital market investors and to foreign investors via securitization. But with the entire capital of the US financial system at $1.3 trillion such staggering losses will lead to a systemic banking crisis and systemic financial crisis. No wonder that Bernanke is now telling non-bank primary brokers that the Fed exceptional liquidity support (TAF, TSLF and especially PDCF) will be extended into 2009. And no wonder that Geithner, Paulson and Bernanke have now all three spoken of the need to find orderly ways to let even large and systemically important institutions go bankrupt if they are insolvent.

The consequences of this credit unwinding and a hard landing in the United States have damaging global consequences, as well. This article, again by Nouriel Roubini, outlines why the current international monetary regime known as Bretton Woods 2 could collapse in the wake of an expanding global credit crisis, and our current trade imbalances:

Will the Bretton Wood 2 Regime of fixed and/or heavily managed exchange rates in many emerging market economies collapse in the same way as the Bretton Woods 1 regime (the “dollar standard” regime that ruled after 1945 in the global economy) collapsed in the early 1970s? What are the similarities and differences between those two regimes? It is interesting to note that the same factors – U.S twin deficit, U.S. loose monetary policies and fixed pegs to the U.S. in the dollar standard regime of Bretton Woods (1945-1971) - that led to the commodity inflation and goods inflation in the early 1970s and thus to the demise of the Bretton Woods 1 regime (in the 1971-73 period) are also partially the same factors that are leading now to the rise in commodity and goods inflation in emerging markets that are pegging to the U.S. dollar and/or heavily managing their exchange rates.

Thus, like the rise of commodity and goods inflation led to the demise of BW1 the current rise in commodity and goods inflation in emerging market economies may be the trigger that will lead – as argued in my 2005 BW2 paper with Brad Setser and a more recent 2007 paper of mine – to the demise of BW2. It is true that BW2 is still alive as the massive ongoing reserve accumulation by BRICs, GCC and other emerging markets suggests. But the rise in inflation that these exchange rate policies are causing may soon lead to its demise: abandoning pegs and/or letting currencies appreciate at a faster rate will be the necessary step to control inflation in such emerging market economies.

Every country is between a rock and a hard place:

By now inflation has become so high in so many emerging market economies that – in some dimensions – it is almost too allow these currencies to appreciate: inflation is so high that only an abandonment of pegs or of heavily managed rates and a very sharp nominal exchange rate appreciation would be able to control inflation Even in that case nominal appreciation would not be enough to control expected inflation: a much tighter monetary and credit policy – that is feasible only if enough exchange rate flexibility is allowed – would be necessary to control actual and expected inflation. But now the global economic outlook has much worsened with the US recession and the sharp economic slowdown in most advanced economies. The need to control inflation with a stronger currency and much tighter monetary policy in emerging markets is happening at a time when downside risks to growth are emerging in these countries because of the US recession and the slowdown in the advanced economies growth rate. Thus, emerging market policy makers face a serious dilemma: controlling inflation requires exchange rate flexibility and much tighter monetary and credit policy. But such policy may exacerbate the growth landing of these economies at the time when global conditions are leading to a sharp slowdown of growth in advanced economies that – in due time – will slow down exports and growth of the emerging market economies.

Thus, it is not obvious that the members of BW2 will decide to phase out this regime and move to greater currency flexibility and tighter monetary and credit conditions. Rising oil, energy and food inflation in these economies is already leading to popular unrest, riots and – in some cases – ruling governments being toppled. Thus, the last thing that these economies need is a sharp growth slowdown on top of socially unpopular rising inflation. That is why – while the rational choice would be phasing out BW2, allow greater exchange rate flexibility, regain monetary autonomy, allow currencies to appreciate and tighten monetary/credit conditions – many of these BW2 may be reluctant to follow this painful policy path.

But again, these problems, consequences, and suboptimal “solutions” are simply the result of a suboptimal and unstable system working as designed.

Finally, we must consider these financial instabilities in a world where the fundamental life-giving resources such as food and energy are becoming increasingly precious:

Every Barrel Now Counts: What Prospects for More Oil Supplies?

IEA Medium-Term Outlook

While we complain about high food prices, other countries — some to whom we owe a great deal of money — are seeing riots and social unrest. The bottom line is that food and energy prices are not separate from this economic crisis. They are intimately related, for two reasons.

First, food and energy are fundamentally equivalent even beyond irrational corn ethanol subsidies. By some estimates, our unsustainable system of industrial agriculture requires 10 calories of fossil fuels for each one food calorie produced. What happens as fossil fuels become more expensive based upon growing global demand against finite supplies?

Second, many countries with food and fuel inflation high enough to spark riots and social unrest, and to whom we owe a lot of money, are keeping their currency artificially low against our dollar to stimulate exports. What happens if the pain of social unrest in China is great enough for them to abruptly let their currency float?

A rapid strengthening of China’s currency would reduce the value of their $1.4 trillion in dollar holdings. On the other hand, such a rapid appreciation would give them an instant discount on their dollar-denominated commodities such as fuel and fertilizer, and is the ultimate solution to their price inflation.  What would be the consequence for us, however, as high prices causing riots and social instability abroad transfer to our shores?

Mutually assured destruction did not end with the Cold War — our position in the global economy can also be described as mutually assured economic destruction.

We need principled leadership that recognizes the root causes behind the threats we face, and we need a government that empowers us to build a sustainable society. Such sustainability has not, and cannot, come from a federal government that consolidates power, exceeds its Constitutional authority, and serves corporate and special interests.

Critically, we must recognize that our economic, energy, environmental, and agricultural policies do not operate in isolation — they are all related, and they all exist on the foundation of an unstable monetary system that bring us to this precarious situation. We live in interesting times.

This entry was posted on Friday, July 11th, 2008 at 1:27 am and is filed under China, banking, debt, economic freedom, environmentalism, inflation, monetary reform, peak oil. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.