In a previous post, we discussed the hazards (moral and otherwise) of fractional reserve banking. Once you understand fractional reserve banking, you understand why we need a central bank.
When you have a fractional reserve banking system, each bank is technically insolvent in that it cannot meet all of its depositors’ demands for their money. If all holders of demand deposits came to the bank to withdraw their funds, the run on the bank would force the bank to close down. It’s only the depositor’s confidence that the money will be there that keeps the bank in business.
Since that confidence proves shaky — witness the case of Northen Rock, or even Bear Stearns — the idea of “reserve pooling” gradually arose. The idea is that if an individual bank runs into trouble, other banks can temporarily lend it funds to meet its demands. The endgame for reserve pooling, however, is a single bank that has the power to arbitrarily create money — the central bank.
Our central bank, the Federal Reserve, was commissioned in 1913. It is not federal, and is owned by its member banks. The Federal Reserve interacts with the banking system in a simple but important way — it is the “lender of last resort”. That means that when a bank runs into trouble, the Federal Reserve will be there to bail it out, or orchestrate a merger or other transaction that will prevent collapse of the institution, or the entire system.
How does the Federal Reserve do its job? Today’s Federal Reserve is best known for setting the so-called “Fed Funds Rate“, or the price at which banks borrow money from each other overnight. Why would banks borrow from each other? One reason is to meet reserve requirements. If you own a bank, and make a new car or mortgage loan, you create new money for that loan in your borrower’s demand deposit account. You don’t need to have enough “reserves” in advance to make that loan, however — you can just borrow the necessary reserves in an overnight loan from other banks, and you should expect to pay close to the Federal Reserve’s target rate.
The Federal Reserve manages this interest rate by so-called “open market operations“, where the Federal Reserve buys and sells securities in an effort to keep interest rates close to its target. Right now, the Federal Reserve’s “Fed Funds Rate” is set at 2%. When banks are unwilling to lend to each other, and rates creep upwards, the Federal Reserve will add reserves to drive that interest rate down towards its target. Even if banks don’t have surplus reserves to lend, the Federal Reserve will still work to ensure that banks can borrow reserves at its target rate.
So what’s the problem with this system? Well, let’s take the words “add reserves”. The Fed “adds reserves” by purchasing debt, or providing a loan against debt (called a repurchase agreement, or repo).
When the Federal Reserve purchases debt from our government, or provides a loan against debt for a bank, it pays for that debt in Federal Reserve Notes. Where does the Federal Reserve get its Federal Reserve Notes? Well, the Federal Reserve has the unique ability to create new ones. In other words, the Fed has the ability to write a worthless check, and create new money.
Besides the moral issue of letting our central bank create new money that competes with money you’ve earned for goods and services, does this system really make sense?
No, it does not. Many people believe that in order for a bank to make a loan, someone must have first saved money, and made a deposit. That’s simply not true. When the Federal Reserve sets the interest rate at which banks can borrow to meet their reserve requirements, banks compete to make loans and create new paper money based upon their cost of borrowing, as opposed to the amount of reserves they have on deposit. Practically speaking, banks are limited in the amount of loans they can make based upon capital requirements, not reserve requirements.
In addition to the Federal Reserve’s ability to create money to lend to banks is the Federal Reserve’s ability to create money to give to our government. Our United States Treasury is constantly issuing new debt — we’re a “payday lender” nation whose government is constantly rolling over old debt into new debt, and issuing additional debt to pay for our constant budget deficits. Who buys all this debt?
Lots of people, and lots of institutions, purchase our Treasury’s debt. Many of these investors are overseas. The Federal Reserve also purchases our Treasury’s debt. But when the Federal Reserve purchases our government’s debt, unlike you or me, the Fed can give the Treasury a check with no money in the checking account. While you would be charged with fraud for writing worthless checks, it’s business as usual at the Federal Reserve. The Fed’s “checks” simply create new dollars in the Treasury’s checking account.
Money doesn’t grow on trees any more — it’s even easier than that. The Treasury just needs to sell some bonds, and if there aren’t enough willing purchaser with existing dollars, the Federal Reserve creates new electronic money to make up the difference.
So why do we have inflation? One important factor is the Federal Reserve’s new money competing with your earnings and savings for goods and services. Ultimately, our flawed system makes everyone’s dollar worth less.
While the American worker and saver gets hurt by this arrangement, who benefits?
Consider the banks — banks are protected from failure by a central bank that can create money out of nothing. Furthermore, this perception of “stability” allows banks to create loans out of nothing, backed with minimal reserves, and thus claim an ever-greater share of borrowers’ future income through interest payments. More loans leads to more profits — it’s definitely a winner for the banks.
Consider our government — politicians can make promises that we can’t begin to afford, but our central bank’s ability to create money to buy our government’s debt means that politicians can spend obscene amounts of money without raising taxes. Instead, they simply borrow and print new money. As long as the American public is unaware that government benefits are paid for by newly-printed money, and don’t understand the link with rising prices, this system is tolerated. Even the mainstream media is widely ignorant of how this system works.
But the dynamics are changing. We can no longer ignore gas prices, and grocery bills. We can no longer ignore the future costs that our children face. A speech on May 28 entitled “Storms on the Horizon” by Dallas Federal Reserve President and CEO Richard Fisher (world government fans unite — check out his biography in Spanish!) paints a surprisingly realistic picture:
Tonight, I want to talk about a different matter. In keeping with Bill Martin’s advice, I have been scanning the horizon for danger signals even as we continue working to recover from the recent turmoil. In the distance, I see a frightful storm brewing in the form of untethered government debt. I choose the words—“frightful storm”—deliberately to avoid hyperbole. Unless we take steps to deal with it, the long-term fiscal situation of the federal government will be unimaginably more devastating to our economic prosperity than the subprime debacle and the recent debauching of credit markets that we are now working so hard to correct.
You might wonder why a central banker would be concerned with fiscal matters. Fiscal policy is, after all, the responsibility of the Congress, not the Federal Reserve. Congress, and Congress alone, has the power to tax and spend. From this monetary policymaker’s point of view, though, deficits matter for what we do at the Fed. There are many reasons why. Economists have found that structural deficits raise long-run interest rates, complicating the Fed’s dual mandate to develop a monetary policy that promotes sustainable, noninflationary growth. The even more disturbing dark and dirty secret about deficits—especially when they careen out of control—is that they create political pressure on central bankers to adopt looser monetary policy down the road. I will return to that shortly. First, let me give you the unvarnished facts of our nation’s fiscal predicament.
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Doing deficit math is always a sobering exercise. It becomes an outright painful one when you apply your calculator to the long-run fiscal challenge posed by entitlement programs. Were I not a taciturn central banker, I would say the mathematics of the long-term outlook for entitlements, left unchanged, is nothing short of catastrophic.
Typically, critics ranging from the Concord Coalition to Ross Perot begin by wringing their collective hands over the unfunded liabilities of Social Security. A little history gives you a view as to why. Franklin Roosevelt originally conceived a social security system in which individuals would fund their own retirements through payroll-tax contributions. But Congress quickly realized that such a system could not put much money into the pockets of indigent elderly citizens ravaged by the Great Depression. Instead, a pay-as-you-go funding system was embraced, making each generation’s retirement the responsibility of its children.
Now, fast forward 70 or so years and ask this question: What is the mathematical predicament of Social Security today? Answer: The amount of money the Social Security system would need today to cover all unfunded liabilities from now on—what fiscal economists call the “infinite horizon discounted value” of what has already been promised recipients but has no funding mechanism currently in place—is $13.6 trillion, an amount slightly less than the annual gross domestic product of the United States.
Demographics explain why this is so. Birthrates have fallen dramatically, reducing the worker–retiree ratio and leaving today’s workers pulling a bigger load than the system designers ever envisioned. Life spans have lengthened without a corresponding increase in the retirement age, leaving retirees in a position to receive benefits far longer than the system designers envisioned. Formulae for benefits and cost-of-living adjustments have also contributed to the growth in unfunded liabilities.
The good news is this Social Security shortfall might be manageable. While the issues regarding Social Security reform are complex, it is at least possible to imagine how Congress might find, within a $14 trillion economy, ways to wrestle with a $13 trillion unfunded liability. The bad news is that Social Security is the lesser of our entitlement worries. It is but the tip of the unfunded liability iceberg. The much bigger concern is Medicare, a program established in 1965, the same prosperous year that Bill Martin cautioned his Columbia University audience to be wary of complacency and storms on the horizon.
Medicare was a pay-as-you-go program from the very beginning, despite warnings from some congressional leaders—Wilbur Mills was the most credible of them before he succumbed to the pay-as-you-go wiles of Fanne Foxe, the Argentine Firecracker—who foresaw some of the long-term fiscal issues such a financing system could pose. Unfortunately, they were right.
Please sit tight while I walk you through the math of Medicare. As you may know, the program comes in three parts: Medicare Part A, which covers hospital stays; Medicare B, which covers doctor visits; and Medicare D, the drug benefit that went into effect just 29 months ago. The infinite-horizon present discounted value of the unfunded liability for Medicare A is $34.4 trillion. The unfunded liability of Medicare B is an additional $34 trillion. The shortfall for Medicare D adds another $17.2 trillion. The total? If you wanted to cover the unfunded liability of all three programs today, you would be stuck with an $85.6 trillion bill. That is more than six times as large as the bill for Social Security. It is more than six times the annual output of the entire U.S. economy.
Why is the Medicare figure so large? There is a mix of reasons, really. In part, it is due to the same birthrate and life-expectancy issues that affect Social Security. In part, it is due to ever-costlier advances in medical technology and the willingness of Medicare to pay for them. And in part, it is due to expanded benefits—the new drug benefit program’s unfunded liability is by itself one-third greater than all of Social Security’s.
Add together the unfunded liabilities from Medicare and Social Security, and it comes to $99.2 trillion over the infinite horizon. Traditional Medicare composes about 69 percent, the new drug benefit roughly 17 percent and Social Security the remaining 14 percent.
What do we do about that? How can we begin to “fund” a $99 trillion liability?
Let’s say you and I and Bruce Ericson and every U.S. citizen who is alive today decided to fully address this unfunded liability through lump-sum payments from our own pocketbooks, so that all of us and all future generations could be secure in the knowledge that we and they would receive promised benefits in perpetuity. How much would we have to pay if we split the tab? Again, the math is painful. With a total population of 304 million, from infants to the elderly, the per-person payment to the federal treasury would come to $330,000. This comes to $1.3 million per family of four—over 25 times the average household’s income.
Clearly, once-and-for-all contributions would be an unbearable burden. Alternatively, we could address the entitlement shortfall through policy changes that would affect ourselves and future generations. For example, a permanent 68 percent increase in federal income tax revenue—from individual and corporate taxpayers—would suffice to fully fund our entitlement programs. Or we could instead divert 68 percent of current income-tax revenues from their intended uses to the entitlement system, which would accomplish the same thing.
Suppose we decided to tackle the issue solely on the spending side. It turns out that total discretionary spending in the federal budget, if maintained at its current share of GDP in perpetuity, is 3 percent larger than the entitlement shortfall. So all we would have to do to fully fund our nation’s entitlement programs would be to cut discretionary spending by 97 percent. But hold on. That discretionary spending includes defense and national security, education, the environment and many other areas, not just those controversial earmarks that make the evening news. All of them would have to be cut—almost eliminated, really—to tackle this problem through discretionary spending.
I hope that gives you some idea of just how large the problem is. And just to drive an important point home, these spending cuts or tax increases would need to be made immediately and maintained in perpetuity to solve the entitlement deficit problem. Discretionary spending would have to be reduced by 97 percent not only for our generation, but for our children and their children and every generation of children to come. And similarly on the taxation side, income tax revenue would have to rise 68 percent and remain that high forever. Remember, though, I said tax revenue, not tax rates. Who knows how much individual and corporate tax rates would have to change to increase revenue by 68 percent?
If these possible solutions to the unfunded-liability problem seem draconian, it’s because they are draconian. But they do serve to give you a sense of the severity of the problem. To be sure, there are ways to lessen the reliance on any single policy and the burden borne by any particular set of citizens. Most proposals to address long-term entitlement debt, for example, rely on a combination of tax increases, benefit reductions and eligibility changes to find the trillions necessary to safeguard the system over the long term.
No combination of tax hikes and spending cuts, though, will change the total burden borne by current and future generations. For the existing unfunded liabilities to be covered in the end, someone must pay $99.2 trillion more or receive $99.2 trillion less than they have been currently promised. This is a cold, hard fact. The decision we must make is whether to shoulder a substantial portion of that burden today or compel future generations to bear its full weight.
OK, so if we can’t cut spending, and if we can’t increase taxes, are there other options?
Now that you are all thoroughly depressed, let me come back to monetary policy and the Fed.
It is only natural to cast about for a solution—any solution—to avoid the fiscal pain we know is necessary because we succumbed to complacency and put off dealing with this looming fiscal disaster. Throughout history, many nations, when confronted by sizable debts they were unable or unwilling to repay, have seized upon an apparently painless solution to this dilemma: monetization. Just have the monetary authority run cash off the printing presses until the debt is repaid, the story goes, then promise to be responsible from that point on and hope your sins will be forgiven by God and Milton Friedman and everyone else.
We know from centuries of evidence in countless economies, from ancient Rome to today’s Zimbabwe, that running the printing press to pay off today’s bills leads to much worse problems later on. The inflation that results from the flood of money into the economy turns out to be far worse than the fiscal pain those countries hoped to avoid.
Earlier I mentioned the Fed’s dual mandate to manage growth and inflation. In the long run, growth cannot be sustained if markets are undermined by inflation. Stable prices go hand in hand with achieving sustainable economic growth. I have said many, many times that inflation is a sinister beast that, if uncaged, devours savings, erodes consumers’ purchasing power, decimates returns on capital, undermines the reliability of financial accounting, distracts the attention of corporate management, undercuts employment growth and real wages, and debases the currency.
Purging rampant inflation and a debased currency requires administering a harsh medicine. We have been there, and we know the cure that was wrought by the FOMC under Paul Volcker. Even the perception that the Fed is pursuing a cheap-money strategy to accommodate fiscal burdens, should it take root, is a paramount risk to the long-term welfare of the U.S. economy. The Federal Reserve will never let this happen. It is not an option. Ever. Period.
Mr. Fisher, I wish I could believe you. Based upon the performance of our dollar against other currencies, it appears that we are doing exactly that. In fact, Alan Greenspan was asked about the problem of how we could meet our Social Security obligations back in 2005. His response at the time? “We can guarantee cash, but we cannot guarantee purchasing power!” In other words, we can print the money, but it won’t buy anything.
Odds are, despite Mr. Fisher’s wishes, we keep borrowing and printing. As Mr. Fisher concluded his speech:
Of late, we have heard many complaints about the weakness of the dollar against the euro and other currencies. It was recently argued in the op-ed pages of the Financial Times [3] that one reason for the demise of the British pound was the need to liquidate England’s international reserves to pay off the costs of the Great Wars. In the end, the pound, it was essentially argued, was sunk by the kaiser’s army and Hitler’s bombs. Right now, we—you and I—are launching fiscal bombs against ourselves. You have it in your power as the electors of our fiscal authorities to prevent this destruction. Please do so.
Mr. Fisher, you are correct. We do have the power to prevent this destruction. The cause of this destruction is the system itself. We cannot afford a debt-backed monetary system controlled by a private central bank that creates money out of nothing — thus facilitating unrestrained spending by politicians interested only in their re-election.
Coupling an unstable banking and monetary system with a government that gives favors in exchange for growing its power is a recipe for collapse into tyranny.